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CONNER V. CITY OF FOREST ACRES:
THE END OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
ERA?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Conner v. City of Forest Acres' the South Carolina Supreme
Court interpreted an employee handbook so as to create ajury question
whether or not the handbook invalidated the at-will employment
relationship between Conner and her employer.' Alone, this is not an
unusual result for a wrongful termination lawsuit. Since Small v.
Springs Industries., Inc.' South Carolina has recognized the
proposition that an employer cannot use an employee handbook to
make promises to the employee while still maintaining that the
handbook does not constitute a contract.4 Thus, courts often allow
employees to sue for breach of an employment contract even when the
employer states that the relationship was at-will.5
However, Conner appears to go beyond this exception to the at-
will employment relationship, as the City of Forest Acres specifically
drafted its employee handbook to avoid the unintended effect of
creating an employment contract.6 Following the suggestion of the
court in Small,7 the drafter articulated a disclaimer in bold,
straightforward language that the handbook was meant to be merely
a guideline and not a contract.8 The court noted the following
disclaimers within the handbook:
1. 348 S.C. 454, 560 S.E.2d 606 (2002).
2. Id. at 464, 560 S.E.2d at 611.
3. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
4. Id. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
5. See Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 463, 450 S.E.2d 589, 595 (1994)
(holding that an employee handbook may alter at-will employment); Small, 292 S.C.
at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454 (allowing a cause of action for wrongful termination when
an employee handbook enumerated offenses that would lead to immediate firing).
6. See Conner, 348 S.C. at 458,560 S.E.2d at 608 ("MANY OF THE POLICIES
CONTAINED IN THIS HANDBOOK ARE BASED ON LEGAL PROVISIONS,
INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW, AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS PRINCIPLES,
ALL OF WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE.").
7. 392 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455 (suggesting that an employer can maintain
the at-will relationship by merely adding a conspicuous disclaimer to the handbook).
8. Conner, 348 S.C. at 458, 560 S.E.2d at 608.
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During her employment, Conner received two
employee handbooks. After receiving each one,
Conner signed an acknowledgment form. The 1993
acknowledgment stated... "I further understand that
nothing in these policies and procedures creates a
contract of employment for any term, that I am an
employee at-will and nothing herein limits the City
of Forest Acres's rights for dismissal."
On page 1 of the handbook . . . there is the
following language: . . . "THIS HANDBOOK IS
CONSIDERED TO BE A GUIDELINE .... THE
HANDBOOK DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR ANY
TERM. NOTHING IN THIS HANDBOOK SHALL
BE CONSTRUED TO CONSTITUTE A
CONTRACT.... NOTHING HEREIN LIMITS
THE CITY'S RIGHTS TO TERMINATE
EMPLOYMENT. ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE
CITY ARE AT-WILL EMPLOYEES ......
This same language appears on the last page of the
handbook.
• .. Additionally, he [sic] handbook states the
following: . . . "NO REQUIREMENT EXISTS
FOR DISCIPLINE TO BE PROGRESSIVE. FIRST
VIOLATIONS CAN RESULT IN IMMEDIATE
DISMISSAL WITHOUT REPRIMAND OR
SUSPENSION."9
The court did not suggest that the language of the actual
disclaimers was ambiguous or difficult for the employee to understand.
Instead, the court looked to the section of the handbook that listed the
procedures for discipline and found them contrary to the spirit of an at-
will employment relationship.'0 Although the handbook indicated that
discipline need not be progressive, the court understood this section to
create a promise on behalf of the defendant." Specifically, the court
relied upon the language of the discipline section that stated violations
"will be disciplined."'" Thus, the court held that summary judgment
was not proper because more than one inference could be drawn as to
9. Id. at 458-59, 560 S.E.2d at 608.
10. Id. at 464, 560 S.E.2d at 611.
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whether or not the handbook altered the at-will employment
relationship. "
Understandably, the result in Conner has created some
consternation within the employment law bar. If the clear language of
this handbook could create a contract, then so would most, if not all,
employee handbooks.
This Note focuses on the erosion of the at-will employment
doctrine and the possible ramifications of the Conner decision. Part II
provides an in-depth discussion of the decision in Conner, exploring
the history of the at-will doctrine as well as the authorities used by the
court to reach its decision. Part III describes the potential impact of the
Conner decision by analyzing how the decision has further eroded the
at-will doctrine. Part IV suggests some practical drafting changes of
employee handbooks that will lessen an employer's potential exposure
to breach of contract suits by its at-will employees. These drafting
suggestions include changing all mandatory words and eliminating
broad policy statements. Finally, Part V suggests an alternative to at-
will employment that might provide South Carolina employers with
greater protection than the at-will doctrine in light of Conner and other
cases that have eroded the at-will doctrine.
II. EROSION OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND THE DECISION IN
CONNER V. CITY OF FORESTACRES
A. The History and Evolution of the At- Will Doctrine
The common law rule of at-will employment states that
employment for an indefinite term is terminable by either the
employee or the employer for any reason.14 "The employment-at-will
doctrine is premised on a theoretical equality of rights. Both employer
and employee have the right to terminate the employment relationship
at any time and for any reason."15 Accordingly, under the traditional
rule, an employer did not incur liability for the wrongful discharge of
an at-will employee. 6 This rule further dictated that a contract of
employment for a term of years, which is not supported by
13. Id. at 464, 560 S.E.2d at 611.
14. See, e.g., Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., Inc., 273 S.C. 766, 769, 259
S.E.2d 812, 813 (1979) (citation omitted) (agreeing that employment for an indefinite
term is considered at-will employment).
15. Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of
Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 329 (1991-92).
16. See, e.g., Hudson, 273 S.C. at 769, 259 S.E.2d at 813 (stating that
employment remains at-will when not supported by independent consideration).
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consideration beyond the obligation to work in exchange for wages,
is still "terminable at the will of either party."' 7 Over the years, courts
have carved out exceptions to the at-will doctrine, and notably, one of
the most common exceptions is the employee handbook. 8
South Carolina recognized this exception in Small v. Springs
Industries, Inc. 9 In Small the employer issued an employee handbook
that set forth a four-step process for discipline.2" The handbook went
on to state that certain offenses, such as fighting and drunkenness,
were excepted from this four-step process and were grounds for
immediate termination." Through this provision, it was argued that the
handbook implied that the lesser offenses would not result in
immediate termination.22
The court stated that "[i]t is patently unjust to allow an employer
to couch a handbook, bulletin, or other similar material in mandatory
terms and then allow him to ignore these very policies as 'a gratuitous
nonbinding statement of general policy' whenever it works to his
disadvantage."2 3 Therefore, the court held that a jury should decide
whether or not the handbook created an employment contract.24 To
support its decision, the court stated that "South Carolina [is] a
progressive state which wishes to see that both employer[s] and
employee[s] are treated fairly. 21 5 Importantly, the court noted that an
employer could effectively maintain the at-will relationship while
using handbooks or bulletins if the employer inserted a conspicuous
disclaimer into the document. 6 However, future case law has proven
that the mere insertion of a disclaimer is ineffective.
After Small, courts refined the handbook exception by testing the
conspicuousness of the disclaimer. For example, in Johnson v. First
Carolina Financial Corp.27 the court of appeals found that there was
no genuine issue of fact regarding the conspicuousness of the
disclaimer, and therefore, the employer was entitled to summary
17. Id. at 768, 259 S.E.2d at 813.
18. Befort, supra note 15, at 327.
19. 292 S.C. 481, 486, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987) (holding that a jury can
consider a handbook, along with other materials, to decide whether the employer
altered the at-will employment relationship).
20. Id. at 483, 357 S.E.2d at 453.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
24. Id. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
25. Small, 292 S.C. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
26. Id. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
27. 305 S.C. 556, 409 S.E.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1991).
1116
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss4/13
EMPLOYMENT LAW
judgment.28 Implicitly, Johnson suggested that the conspicuousness of
a disclaimer is a factual question.
In Fleming v. Borden, Inc.29 the South Carolina Supreme Court
further explored the effect of disclaimers in employee handbooks. In
this wrongful termination suit, a jury had found for the defendant, and
the plaintiff appealed, in part, on the grounds that the disclaimer used
in the handbook was ineffective as a matter of law.3" To address the
plaintiff's contention that a judge should have decided the disclaimer
issue, the court cited to Stephen F. Befort's article, Employee
Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers,3 in support of the
notion that the jury should determine the factual question of whether
a disclaimer is conspicuous.32 Befort suggests, "[A] handbook that
contains both promissory language and a disclaimer should be viewed
as inherently ambiguous .... As with any question of fact, this is
primarily a matter for the jury to decide."33
By endorsing the Befort article, this dictum from the Fleming
opinion actually expands the handbook exception. Prior to Fleming,
a handbook could contain promises while maintaining the at-will
relationship if it included a conspicuous disclaimer.34 It did not matter
if the language of the disclaimer and the language of the promises
were in conflict. As long as a jury determined that the disclaimer was
conspicuous or the court determined that the disclaimer was
conspicuous as a matter of law, the handbook was viewed as merely
advisory.35 However, the Befort article suggests that employers should
be bound by their promises, in spite of the disclaimers, if the promises
28. Id. at 560, 409 S.E.2d at 806.
29. 316 S.C. 452, 450 S.E.2d 589 (1994).
30. Id. at 454, 460, 450 S.E.2d at 591, 594.
31. Befort, supra note 15.
32. Fleming, 315 S.C. at 464, 450 S.E.2d at 596.
33. Befort, supra note 15, at 376.
34. See Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 484, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455
(1987) ("If an employer wishes to issue policies, manuals, or bulletins as purely
advisory statements with no intent of being bound by them... he certainly is free to
do so. This could be accomplished merely by inserting a conspicuous disclaimer or
provision into the written document."); cf Jones v. Gen. Elec. Co., 331 S.C. 351, 364-
65,503 S.E.2d 173, 180-81 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding a disclaimer inconspicuous when
it was located on the last page of the handbook and when it was not capitalized, bolded,
or set apart with a distinctive border or contrasting color).
35. See Johnson v. First Carolina Fin. Corp., 305 S.C. 556, 560,409 S.E.2d 804,
806 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding summary judgment in favor of employer when
conspicuousness of the disclaimer was indisputable); Mart v. City of Columbia, 307
S.C. 545, 547, 416 S.E.2d 615, 616 (1992) (upholding summaryjudgment in favor of
employer when disclaimer was placed in large letters on the front cover of the
handbook and also in large, bold type on a separate page).
2003] 1117
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are such that they conflict with an at-will relationship.3 6 The article
essentially proposes a new test for evaluating disclaimers. The test
involves comparing the disclaimer language with the promissory
language of the handbook.37 Befort is careful to limit this proposal to
situations in which the promise is "sufficiently objective and specific
to lead employees reasonably to believe that the employer will abide
by the expressed representation."3 Ultimately, from Hudson v. Zenith
Engraving Co., Inc.39 to Fleming, South Carolina jurisprudence has
etched out a significant exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
B. The Decision in Conner v. City of Forest Acres
Evelyn Conner was a police dispatcher with the City of Forest
Acres for nearly a decade beginning in July 1984.40 From November
1992 until her eventual termination in October 1993, Conner was
reprimanded for various reasons, such as dress code violations,
tardiness, poor work performance, and "abusive language."'4 After an
"unsatisfactory" evaluation in July 1993, Conner was placed on
probation.42 Ultimately, the city terminated her employment. 43 The
grievance process did not yield favorable results for her, so she sued
the city for, inter alia, breach of contract." Significantly, she relied on
the city's employee handbook as grounds for altering the at-will
employment relationship.45
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
"no contract was created by the handbook because: (1) the procedures
in the employee handbook did not alter Conner's at-will status, (2) the
disclaimers in the handbook were conspicuous and therefore effective,
and (3) Conner signed acknowledgments of her at-will status."46 The
trial court agreed and granted the defendant's motion, but the court of
36. See Befort, supra note 15, at 375.
37. Id. at 374-75.
38. Id. at 374.
39. 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979).





44. Id. at 460, 560 S.E.2d at 609.
45. See id. at 458-59, 560 S.E.2d at 608-09.
46. Conner, 348 S.C. at 462-63, 560 S.E.2d at 610.
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appeals reversed.47 Ultimately, the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals so that the issue is now open to a jury determination."
Applying Fleming,49 the supreme court held that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the handbook contained both
disclaimers and promises.5° It clearly endorsed the Befort article
proposition, quoted in the Fleming opinion, that "credible promises...
should be enforced" and that the handbook should be evaluated in its
entirety to ascertain whether those promises are credible." The
supreme court approved of the Befort article, as cited in Fleming, for
the proposition that the disclaimer is only one factor to consider when
conducting this evaluation.52 Thus, the conspicuousness of the
disclaimer is to be evaluated in the context of the handbook as a
whole. Evaluations of whether the font is large enough, the typeface
is bold enough, and the wording is clear enough are no longer
dispositive.53
In other words, prior to Conner, the test for determining if an
employee handbook altered the at-will relationship related only to
conspicuousness.54 Whether it was decided by a judge as a matter of
law or by ajury as a matter of fact, the employment at-will relationship
survived if a disclaimer was found conspicuous.55 After Conner the
test for determining if a handbook alters the at-will relationship only
uses conspicuousness as one factor.56 First, one must determine if the
handbook contains a promise. If it does, then a jury decides whether
there is a contract based on the totality of the circumstances, including
the conspicuousness of the disclaimer.
In a footnote, the supreme court pointed to three statements in the
city's handbook that contained mandatory language and then used
47. Id. at 457, 560 S.E.2d at 607.
48. Id.
49. 316 S.C. 452, 450 S.E.2d 589 (1994).
50. Conner, 348 S.C. at 463, 348 S.E.2d at 611.
51. Id. (quoting Fleming, 316 S.C. at 464, 450 S.E.2d at 596). The Fleming
court quoted Befort, supra note 15, at 375-76.
52. Id. This language was cited by the court of appeals subsequent to Fleming
but prior to Conner in Abraham v. Palmetto Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 343 S.C. 37, 45
2003] 1119
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those statements to illustrate how the manual is promissory in nature. 7
The court wrote, "[F]or example, the handbook states that: (1)
violations of the Code of Conduct 'will be disciplined,' (2) 'discipline
shall be of an increasingly progressive nature,' and (3) 'all employees
shall be treated fairly and consistently in all matters related to their
employment. "' The court held that "[this] language in the handbook
is mandatory in nature and therefore a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Conner's at-will status was modified."59 In so
holding, the court suggests that any handbook that contains mandatory
words must be litigated beyond a motion for summary judgment.
III. CONNER V. CITY OFFORESTA CRES AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS ON THE
USE OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS IN SOUTH CAROLINA.
A. The Effect of Conner on an Employer's Reliance Upon
Disclaimers to Preserve the At- Will Relationship
The Conner court's clearest message is that employers cannot rely
solely on a well-written disclaimer to preserve their ability to terminate
employees at will. "[T]he disclaimer is merely one factor to consider
in ascertaining whether the handbook as a whole conveys credible
promises that should be enforced."6 However, under the Conner
opinion, this "one" factor is really not a factor at all. If the rest of the
handbook contains no language that could lead to an inference of a
promise, then the disclaimer is unnecessary. This point is best
illustrated by looking to the provisions of the Conner defendant's
handbook, which the court relied upon to find promissory statements.
The court points to the words "shall" and "will" without looking
at the context in which those words are used.6 It fails to fully follow
its own maxim that the handbook should be read as a whole to
determine whether the disclaimer is conspicuous as a matter of law.62
In reality, the word "shall" is used in a broad policy statement, which
reads, "It is the policy of the City of Forest Acres that all employees
shall be treated fairly and consistently in all matters related to their
employment., 63 This statement is simply an expression of the
employer's goals. To infer that this creates a promise is contrary to its
57. Conner, 348 S.C. at 464 n.4, 560 S.E.2d at 611 n.4.
58. Id. (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. at 464, 560 S.E.2d at 611 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 463, 560 S.E.2d at 611 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 459, 560 S.E.2d at 608-09.
62. See id. at 463, 560 S.E.2d at 611.
63. Conner, 348 S.C. at 459, 560 S.E.2d at 609 (emphasis added).
1120
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context. Similarly, the word "will" is used as a warning that the city
will discipline offenders of the code of conduct.64 This sentence does
not promise any benefits to the employee, so a departure from the
assertions would not harm the employee.
The other mandatory statement relied on by the court was that
"'discipline shall be of an increasingly progressive nature."'
' 65
However, the court omitted a key word in that sentence: "Ordinarily,
discipline shall be of an increasingly progressive nature."66 The word
"ordinarily" means that progressive discipline may not be afforded in
every circumstance. Moreover, this "mandatory" sentence is
immediately followed with the bold typed statement that "NO
REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR DISCIPLINE TO BE
PROGRESSIVE., 67 By editing the statement down to just its
mandatory "shall," the court misses the point of evaluating the
language of the handbook as a whole.
The initial principle behind finding a contract in an employee
handbook was that it would be unfair for the employer to receive the
benefit of improved employee attitudes and improved quality of work,
while treating their own promises as illusory.68 However, in Conner
there is no perceptible benefit to the employer. The employee signed
a statement acknowledging that she was an at-will employee. 69 This is
not a situation in which an employer tried to lead the employee into
believing one thing while really intending the opposite to be true.
Regardless of how the court reached its decision, Conner severely
limits the right of an employer to rely on a disclaimer, despite its
conspicuousness, in order to maintain the ability to terminate
employees without cause.
B. What Conner Means for Employee Handbooks in South
Carolina
After Conner a handbook may limit the employer's rights even if
the employee clearly understands he or she can be terminated at will.
This situation will arise when there is some handbook or bulletin
containing language that can be construed as promissory, and
handbook sections providing for progressive discipline may well fall
within this category.
64. Id at 459, 560 S.E.2d at 608.
65. Id. at 464 n.4, 560 S.E.2d at 611 n.4.
66. Id. at 459, 560 S.E.2d at 608 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481,485,357 S.E.2d 452,454 (1987).
69. Conner, 348 S.C. at 458, 560 S.E.2d at 608.
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If the Befort article provides a guideline for South Carolina
employers, then a three-part test should be used to determine whether
the employer ought to be bound by the terms of the handbook. First,
the handbook must contain a "specific promise. '" Befort suggests that
"[njot every handbook term rises to this level. A muddled or vague
statement of general policy does not."'7 It is important to note that
Conner construed a general policy statement to create promissory
language. Thus, this prong of the test is difficult to define in South
Carolina.
The second element of the Befort test looks at "reasonable
employee expectations."" Befort suggests that this reliance refers to
objective group expectations and not the expectations of the
individual.7 3 Therefore, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that
he or she specifically relied on the promissory language of the
handbook.74 In light of this prong, an employer might use it as a
defense. For example, in Conner the employees signed forms
acknowledging that they were at-will employees and that the employer
had a right to terminate accordingly. 75 As a result of these
acknowledgments, it would be unusual for any employee to rely on the
alleged promises of the city's handbook. However, the question of
reliance is factual in nature and, thereby, will be left to a jury's
determination. 6
Finally, the Befort test requires that there be a "substantial benefit
to the employer. 7 7 Presumably, the employer would benefit if the
promissory language fosters good will among the employees. Befort
states "[t]o a great extent, these three factors describe a single
phenomenon. The promise is enforceable because of the resulting
benefit to the employer. The element of reasonable expectation acts as
the conduit from promise to benefit. '71 If the handbook, in spite of a
disclaimer, possesses these three elements, then the promise should be
enforced, and ordinarily, these elements will be determined by ajury.7 9
According to the article, a court should remove the question from
the jury only when "the handbook statements, when read with the
70. Befort, supra note 15, at 374.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 374-75.
73. Id. at 375.
74. Id.
75. Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 458, 560 S.E.2d 606, 608
(2002).
76. See Befort, supra note 15, at 374-75.
77. Id. at 375.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 376.
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disclaimer, could not possibly be interpreted in a promissory
manner."8 Conner interprets this to mean that, if any questionable
handbook statements exist, the disclaimer is only relevant for a jury's
factual determination of the issue.8 On the other hand, Befort and
Fleming 2 both acknowledge that there are circumstances that call for
summary judgment.83 As an example of such a circumstance, Fleming
points to Johnson v. First Carolina Financial Corp.,4 in which the
disclaimer was printed on the first and last pages of the handbook in
bold, enlarged type font.85 The Fleming opinion stated that summary
judgment was not proper in the case because "the disclaimer was not
as conspicuous as the disclaimer in Johnson."86 Through this analysis,
the supreme court clearly suggested that there are disclaimers worthy
of summary judgment.
In Johnson the court of appeals granted summary judgment
because the disclaimer was conspicuous and because the employee
acknowledged that he was not hired for a specified term.87 However;
after Conner the court would not reach the same conclusion today.
Like Johnson, Conner signed an acknowledgment of her at-will status,
and the disclaimer used by the City of Forest Acres was at least
comparable to the one used in Johnson.8 An employer in South
Carolina is more likely to find himself in front of a jury seeking a
determination that the relationship remains at-will because Conner
permits the most tenuous of mandatory language to create a promise.
80. Id. at 377. Similar language is also cited in Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C.
452, 464, 450 S.E.2d 589, 596 (1994).
81. See Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 464, 560 S.E.2d 606, 611
(2002).
82. 316 S.C. at 452, 450 S.E.2d at 589.
83. Id. at 464, 450 S.E.2d at 596; Befort, supra note 15, at 377.
84. 305 S.C. 556, 409 S.E.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1991).
85. Fleming, 316 S.C. at 464, 560 S.E.2d at 596.
86. Id. at 465, 560 S.E.2d at 597.
87. 305 S.C. at 560, 409 S.E.2d at 806.
88. The handbook used by First Carolina Financial Corp. contained three
disclaimers, one of which was in large, bold type. Id. at 557-58,409 S.E.2d at 805. The
handbook used by the City of Forest Acres contained at least four disclaimers,
including the signed acknowledgment. Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454,
458-59, 560 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (2002). The disclaimers in both handbooks consisted
of substantially similar language and large, bold font size. See Johnson, 305 S.C. at
557-58, 409 S.E.2d at 805; Conner, 348 S.C. at 458-59, 560 S.E.2d at 608-09.
2003] 1123
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IV. PRESERVING BOTH AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE
HANDBOOKS AFTER CONNER V. CITY OF FORESTA CRES
Conner's impact on employers is significant. In response, the
South Carolina General Assembly is debating the passage of an at-will
employment statute. As of the date of this writing, House Bill 3448 is
awaiting debate in the Senate. 9 Currently, the bill reads:
It is the public policy of this State that:
(1) The employment-at-will doctrine applies to the
relationship between an employee and an employer.
(2) As used in this chapter, the term "employment-
at-will doctrine" is specifically defined as the right of
an employee or an employer to terminate the
employment relationship with or without notice to
the other and with or without cause, except as
provided in item (4). If an employee or an employer
terminates an employment relationship under the
employment-at-will doctrine, then neither party will
be liable to the other for any claim for wrongful
termination based on breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
or any other claim in which an express or implied
contract is alleged.
(3) No handbook, policy, procedure, or other
document issued by an employer or its agent may
form an express or implied contract of employment,
except as described in item (4).
(4) An employee and an employer may enter into a
contract of employment to which item (2) does not
apply if:
(a) the contract is in writing;
(b) the contract is signed by the employee and
an authorized agent of the
employer; and
(c) the contract expressly provides that the
parties intend to alter their at-will employment
relationship.
(5) This section applies to both public and private
employment. However, nothing in this section shall
89. See H.R. 3448, 115th Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2003).
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be construed to affect the rights of employees and
employers as defined by a collective bargaining
agreement or the constitutional or statutory rights of
public employees under applicable grievance
procedures.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
allow an employer to terminate an employee in
violation of public policy.9"
The proposed legislation soundly overrules Conner. As written,
it also overrules Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.91 and wholly
eliminates the handbook exception to at-will employment in South
Carolina. While a few states have passed some legislation creating a
strong preference for at-will employment, if passed, South Carolina
will be the first state to employ such far-reaching legislation.92
Because the proposed legislation removes the handbook as an
issue for consideration, the following suggestions for South Carolina
employers retain only partial significance. If this legislation passes, it
will apply to employment relationships created subsequent to its
passage.93 Therefore, employees who are currently employed under
either an express or implied contract would remain subject to the
Conner holding. The recommendations that follow are intended to
provide practical suggestions to employers who wish to utilize an
employee handbook without fearing the unintended effect of creating
a contract.
A. Drafting Proposals Intended to Maintain the At-Will
Relationship
At first blush, an employer might think that the best response to
Conner is to cease using handbooks. Although the court has arguably
taken the employee handbook exception to a new level, it is not
necessarily fatal to the use of handbooks. This is fortunate for both
90. Id.
91. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E. 2d 452 (1987).
92. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (West 2003) (requiring a writing
in order to alter the at-will presumption but also expressly permitting a handbook to
suffice as that writing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (200 1) (defining all employment
as at-will, unless for a specified term, but appearing not to require any specific type of
proof of that term).
93. The Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution generally prevents states from
passing laws which retroactively apply to contractual obligations. See U.S. CONST. art.
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employers and employees because employee handbooks serve a vital
function in the workplace. They provide guidelines so that employees
have advance notice about what is expected from them, which serves
to benefit the employee.
Another role of the employee handbook is purely tactical. By
setting forth procedures for discipline, the employer informs
supervisors and managers of a non-discriminatory method of
discipline. The goal is to prevent supervisors and managers from
acting in violation of various anti-discrimination laws.94 Ultimately,
this benefits the employer by preventing conduct that leads to
expensive lawsuits.
South Carolina employers should now be especially cautious in
drafting handbook sections pertaining to progressive discipline and to
discipline generally. Anyone charged with the responsibility of
drafting a handbook should avoid mandatory words such as "will" and
"shall." Because these are the words seized upon by the court as
mandatory, employers should simply remove them. This is an
effortless, mechanical drafting change. However, more is required than
a mechanical drafting change in order to ensure that a handbook will
not create a contractual obligation. The Conner court suggested that
the handbook, in its entirety, determines whether the employer has
made a promise that conflicts with the disclaimers.95 Thus, all
handbooks should be drafted and edited to create a consistent message,
in addition to eliminating "shalls" and "wills" from the text.
Further, employers should be careful to avoid making any
statements that imply that a certain disciplinary process can be
expected. An employer that wants to include a non-exclusive list of
terminable offenses should list them and then state, "any other conduct
that the company, in its sole discretion, deems worthy of disciplinary
action up to and including discharge."96 This type of general statement
reminds employees that any conduct the employer disapproves of may
be grounds for termination, which largely reiterates the at-will
doctrine.
Perhaps more importantly, employers would be wise to leave
overly broad or gratuitous policy statements out of their employee
handbooks altogether. The policy statement in Conner stated, "It is the
94. See The Art of Firing-Part I, S.C. EMP. L. LETTER (McNair Law Firm, P.A.,
Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 1998, at 5, 6 (listing the "written record" as an advantage that
is useful in preventing and defending a lawsuit arising from termination of
employment).
95. Conner, 348 S.C. at 464, 560 S.E.2d at 611.
96. Does the At-Will Doctrine Survive?, S.C. EMP. L. LETTER (McNair Law
Firm, P.A., Columbia, S.C.), March 2002, at 1, 3.
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policy of the City of Forest Acres that all employees shall be treated
fairly and consistently in all matters related to their employment."97
While some policy statements, such as equal employment opportunity
statements, serve important purposes, the only benefit that grows from
this statement in Conner is a sense of good will. Because good will is
a benefit to the employer, it can be used as evidence that the at-will
policy is not fair to the employee. The policy statement was a key
factor in the court's decision that a jury should determine whether or
not the handbook created a contract. Although it seems to be a stretch
to say that an employer's goals are always promises, there is no good
reason for including this type of policy statement when it can destroy
the at-will employment relationship that the employer has worked to
retain.
B. Avoiding a Jury Determination ofthe Rights and Obligations
Between Employers and Employees
Conner is the culmination of a judicial trend towards narrowing
the at-will doctrine.98 In light of this apparent judicial preference, an
employer might want to consider bypassing the issue altogether and
using an arbitration clause in the employee handbook to serve this
objective. An employer could choose to grant its employees
contractual employment-as opposed to at-will-in exchange for an
agreement requiring contract disputes to be arbitrated.
Under this proposal, the employer knows ahead of time that
employees are not terminable without cause. It is always advantageous
to know what to expect instead of waiting until after an employee
takes a complaint to court. Also, the employer is then free to define
which actions are cause for termination. An advantage to this approach
is that an arbitrator, not a jury, will decide the fate of the employee's
complaint, and it is reasonable to believe that jurors are more
sympathetic to employees.
However, there are some disadvantages to such arrangements. An
arbitration clause in an employment contract might encourage more
litigation because employees are guaranteed a forum for their
complaints. Increased expenses will accompany this increase in
litigation. Therefore, alternatively, an employer could maintain the at-
will employment relationship while also requiring the employee to
sign a separate arbitration contract. This approach is illustrated in
97. Conner, 348 S.C. at 459, 560 S.E.2d at 609.
98. See supra Part II.
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Towles v. United Healthcare Corp. ," in which the handbook stated,
"[T]he provisions in this Handbook are guidelines and, except for the
provisions of the Employment Arbitration Policy, do not establish a
contract or any particular terms or condition of employment... " 00
In Towles the court of appeals agreed to compel arbitration of the
plaintiff's various complaints'0 ' and noted that there is a strong public
policy favoring arbitration.'0 2 Therefore, although Towels argued that
he was unaware of the arbitration agreement, the court enforced it
because he signed an acknowledgment of the clause.'0 3
Under this proposal, an employer still retains the right to terminate
an employee for any reason. The key difference is that the legal forum
is chosen in advance for the unfortunate circumstances that may
require it. Certainly, arbitration is not a perfect answer to all
employment matters; however, it is an option for some employers who
have a need for highly defined handbooks that might already alter the
at-will relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
Although South Carolina theoretically acknowledges the at-will
employment doctrine, recent case law suggests that this doctrine is less
effective when an employer uses an employee handbook. This is
certainly true after Conner v. City of Forest Acres.10 4 While this
decision is not fatal to the use of employee handbooks in at-will
arrangements, it does demand greater scrutiny of handbook language.
This Note has given a brief history of the at-will doctrine, as well
as its erosion. Further, this Note has attempted to analyze Conner in
light of the precedent that created it. The Conner decision clearly
reveals that any combination of disclaimers and mandatory language
is subject to a jury determination. Finally, this Note has suggested a
few options for employers who wish to continue using handbooks
while still trying to maintain a traditional at-will employment.
In light of South Carolina's case law, an employer is more likely
to convince a judge that summary judgment is appropriate in a
wrongful termination suit if he eliminates mandatory words and
promissory statements. Alternatively, an employer can opt-out of the
at-will employment dilemma and create a binding arbitration contract.
99. 338 S.C. 29, 524 S.E.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1999).
100. Id. at 33-34, 524 S.E.2d at 842.
101. Id. at 41, 524 S.E. 2d at 846.
102. Id. at 37, 524 S.E.2d at 844.
103. Id. at 39, 524 S.E. 2d at 845.
104. 348 S.C. 454, 560 S.E.2d 606 (2002).
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Regardless of how employers choose to frame their relationships with
employees, it is critical that all employers be aware of the implications
of the Conner decision.
Alana Kyriakakis Heaton
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